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Tick-Tock: Preparing for
the Next Influenza Pandemic
Eileen Salinsky, Principal Research Associate
OVERVIEW — This paper describes the nature of pandemic influenza and
highlights key challenges for responding to this disease threat. It explains how
an influenza pandemic would differ from annual influenza outbreaks and examines how a pandemic virus could emerge. It also explores important issues
involved in pandemic preparedness capabilities, including disease surveillance,
vaccine production and distribution, antiviral stockpiling, health care system
readiness, and public health containment measures. The national pandemic
preparedness plan is briefly reviewed, and unresolved policy issues related to
the plan’s implementation are identified.
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Tick-Tock: Preparing for the Next
Influenza Pandemic

Over one-fourth of the nation’s population has been stricken by a mysterious, fast-moving, and virulent communicable disease. Among the huge
number of people who have contracted the disease, a small but significant proportion die. In mere months, the killer disease has left over half a
million people dead nationwide and over 21 million dead globally. Death
rates among young adults are particularly high.
Severe shortages of nurses and doctors leave many to suffer alone without
medical attention. Schools, churches, and other community organizations
close. Essential services such as police protection, transportation, and telecommunications nearly grind to a halt due to the staggering number of
people incapacitated by the disease. The economic impact is enormous and
millions of dollars are lost. In many urban areas, the bodies of the dead
begin to pile up because morticians are unable to keep pace with the number of fatalities, adding to the public’s sense of panic and despair.
To prevent further disease spread, Congress dedicates unprecedented resources for identifying the cause of the disease and developing an effective treatment. The U.S. Public Health Service also investigates a widely
held theory that Bayer aspirin1 has been intentionally contaminated to
spread the disease.
This grim scenario may appear to be a modern day bioterrorism nightmare. It is, in fact, a description of the influenza pandemic that swept the
globe in 1918, commonly (though mistakenly) called the Spanish flu. Since
then, the world has witnessed two, less lethal pandemics, and most experts believe it is simply a question of when—not if—another influenza
pandemic will confront us.

A MATTER OF TIME
In many ways, we are much better prepared to confront the challenges of
another pandemic than at the turn of the century. Advances in virology
have enabled the development of influenza vaccines that provide disease
immunity. Effective antibiotics exist to control the secondary bacterial
infections that contributed to the high mortality rates in 1918. Diagnostic
technology and surveillance capacity are much more sophisticated than
they were in the early 20th century.
Despite improvements to medical technologies and public health practice, pandemic influenza still brings challenges, perhaps even greater than
those of 1918. There is still no cure for influenza. Antivirals add therapeutic

pan·dem·ic [from the
Greek pan (all) +
demos (people)]: used
to describe a worldwide epidemic.
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value and lessen the disease’s impact, but these agents are in short supply
and have other significant limitations. Also, while antibiotics are now available, antibiotic resistance has become extremely common; therefore, the
reliability of existing antibiotics cannot be assured. Further complicating
these risks, a much larger number of people are immunocompromised,
such as the elderly and persons with HIV/AIDS, placing new demands on
contemporary medical and public health systems.
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The next infectious
disease threat could
be just a plane ride
away.

Most disturbingly, the vaccine development process will be measured
in months, whereas disease spread may be measured in hours. The globalization of human society along with the ease of air travel mean that
influenza will spread across the planet much more quickly than it did
nearly a century ago. Demographic shifts further compound the rapidity with which a pandemic is likely to spread. Since 1918, the world’s
population has grown threefold and is increasingly concentrated in large,
densely populated metropolitan areas.
The recent outbreak of SARS initially caused many public health officials
to worry that the next pandemic had indeed arrived. Heroic work by
virologists around the world quickly revealed that the disease agent responsible for SARS was not influenza. Although SARS itself represented
a significant health challenge, the public health community breathed a
collective sigh of relief that the sands of time had not yet run completely
through the pandemic hourglass. The SARS scare did serve as a compelling reminder that the next infectious disease threat could be just a plane
ride away and that the international spread of a communicable organism
is rapid. Had SARS been as difficult to contain as a pandemic influenza,
international penetration would have been not only rapid, but complete.
Developing an adequate response to pandemic influenza represents an
immediate challenge to policymakers. The difficult decisions involved in
this challenge are grounded in a host of complex scientific and technical
issues that characterize the unique nature of pandemic influenza.
Policymakers will rely, to a large extent, on the recommendations of scientific experts who are well versed in these complexities. However, it is
critical for the elected officials who will make pandemic-related decisions
to gain a clear understanding of the pandemic influenza threat. Although
they will not have to confront many of these decisions until a pandemic
occurs, many more choices must be grappled with now to ensure an effective response when needed.

NATURE OF THE BEAST
Influenza is generally an acute, self-limiting upper respiratory infection
that is easily transferred from person to person through respiratory droplets (via coughing, sneezing, etc.). It is highly communicable for a variety
of reasons, including its ease of transmission, short incubation period,
infectivity before the onset and in the early stages of symptoms, and ability to remain viable outside the body for hours, especially in cold weather.
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During the annual influenza season, complications and death occur in a
limited proportion of cases, particularly among high-risk groups like older
persons and young children whose bodies are immunologically weaker.
Common complications include secondary bacterial infections and exacerbation of existing chronic conditions, like cardiopulmonary disease. A
“normal” influenza season in the United States typically results in 36,000
deaths and 114,000 hospitalizations nationally, with mortality and severe
morbidity largely concentrated in persons over the age of 65.2

Differences Between
Pandemic Influenza and the Annual “Flu”
The influenza virus is a particularly vexing public health threat due to its
ability to change over time and elude the body’s natural defense mechanisms. When infected by a microorganism, the human body produces
antibodies that react with and incapacitate the invader. These antibodies
are highly specific to substances (antigens) on the outer surface of the
infective agent, and generally form about 10 to 14 days after initial contact with the antigen. (The time frame varies depending on the type and
dose of the antigen.)
A second exposure to the same or a closely related antigen will result in
a much quicker and stronger production of antibodies, preventing or
greatly reducing the impact of illness. In this way people acquire immunity or resistance to specific disease agents, and this “immunological memory” generally lasts a lifetime. The influenza virus, however, is
able to essentially outsmart the body’s immunological memory by
changing its outer surface through genetic mutation. Thus, people are
susceptible to infection even if they’ve already contracted influenza or
have been previously immunized.
The degree to which the influenza virus will change is highly unpredictable, as is the impact these changes will have on individuals’ ability to
mount an immune response. Human influenza viruses are classified into
three main types: A, B, and C. During nonpandemic periods, influenza A
and B viruses evolve by accumulating mutations, a process called “antigenic drift.” These new strains created by antigenic drift necessitate annual
changes in the composition of the influenza vaccine. However, because the
changes are relatively minor, most people will be able to mount an immune response that offers some protection to a new strain (due to prior
exposure to similar strains) even if they have not been vaccinated.
Occasionally, the influenza virus will undergo a sudden, dramatic change,
in one or both of two surface proteins called haemagglutin (H) and
neuraminidase (N). This type of change is known as “antigenic shift,”
and may result in a pandemic. When the antigenic profile of the virus
changes rapidly and significantly, it is likely that the surface of the virus
will look completely different than what the body has seen before, superseding the immunological memory capacity of most people and leaving
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them highly vulnerable to this particular strain. Such “novel” subtypes
have not previously infected humans or have not infected humans for a
long time.
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Not all viruses spread
or cause pandemics.

Pandemic strains spread rapidly throughout the global population precisely because few (if any) people are immune. During normal influenza
epidemics, portions of the population have complete or partial immunity
to the circulating strain. Fully immune persons act as brakes on the spread
of the disease. Because they don’t become infected, they are unlikely to
spread the disease to others. When a population includes a large number
of immune persons, the population is said to have “herd immunity.” Under
these conditions, the virus cannot find enough susceptible people to infect and transmission is slowed dramatically. In a pandemic, no herd immunity exists, almost everyone is susceptible, and the disease spreads
unchecked throughout the population.

Causes of Antigenic Shift
Antigenic shift is typically caused by genetic reassortment, which occurs
when human influenza viruses exchange genes with animal influenza
viruses, allowing the virus to acquire new H or N antigens. The resulting
strains are identified by their H or N subtype. In other words, a pandemic strain represents a new “breed” of influenza virus, whereas the
changes observed annually reflect variations within a breed.
The number of animal hosts that can contract influenza compounds the
potential for antigenic shift. Type A influenza3 infections are common in
free-living aquatic birds and also occur in many types of domesticated animals, including chickens, ducks, turkeys, swine, and horses. These animals
are often referred to as disease reservoirs. Although the viral strains that
infect these animals generally do not transmit to humans, such transmission is possible. Fortunately, if animal-to-human transmission does occur,
these viral strains do not usually transmit well between humans.
The potential for genetic reassortment, and thus a possible pandemic, is
perhaps greatest when a person or animal is simultaneously infected with
both a human influenza virus and an animal influenza virus. This type of
co-infection might allow a human influenza virus (already well adapted
for person-to-person spread) to acquire an unfamiliar antigenic profile
through reassortment. Co-infection is not, however, a necessary prerequisite for a pandemic. An animal influenza virus could gain the ability to
infect people and transmit between people through spontaneous genetic
mutation, rather than reassortment, but such events are thought to be
very rare.

Novel Virus: Cause for Concern, but Not Alarm
Although all pandemics begin with the emergence of a novel virus, not
all novel viruses spread or cause pandemics. For example, in 1976 a novel
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subtype of influenza caused a localized outbreak at Fort Dix and the first
person known to have contracted the virus died. Laboratory testing
showed that the strain (H1N1) was related to the strain that created the
1918 pandemic. Many at the fort were found to have contracted the virus,
suggesting the likelihood of person-to-person spread within the barracks.
A major campaign was initiated to develop a vaccine and vaccinate the
population against this “swine flu.” However, the virus did not spread
widely beyond the camp. Some believe that the decision to initiate and
promote a vaccine program was premature, damaged the credibility of
public health, and contributed to the public’s complacency about infectious disease threats. As it is often said, however, hindsight is 20/20. In
the case of swine flu, the specter of another influenza pandemic prompted
aggressive, albeit flawed, decision making.

The Next Pandemic
Though “near misses” do not necessarily generate pandemics, they are
cause for serious concern. As the number of human cases infected by animal viruses increases, the probability of co-infection increases, and the
chances of reassortment improve. The genetic reassortment that can take
place during co-infections is as uncertain as a roll of the dice: A pandemic
strain may or may not emerge. If one does, that strain’s characteristics,
such as virulence, communicability, and pathological properties, cannot
be determined in advance.
Although the characteristics of the next pandemic virus are impossible to
predict, the scale of any influenza pandemic ensures significant levels of
social disruption and increased mortality relative to a “normal” flu season. Preliminary estimates indicate that an influenza pandemic would
cause between 88,000 and 227,000 deaths and economic losses in the range
of $71 to $166 billion in the United States alone.4
These severe health and social consequences have galvanized global planning efforts to prepare for the next pandemic. Recent cases of humans
becoming infected with a highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) in
Thailand and Vietnam have heightened the concerns of public health
authorities. The World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed 34
human cases of H5N1 infection as of March 24, 2004, and 23 of these cases
resulted in death.5 Although the number of human cases has been relatively small thus far, the human fatality rate associated with these cases is
high and the prevalence of the H5N1 strain in poultry throughout China
and Southeast Asia is widespread and persistent. The H5N1 strain has
also been identified in pigs in China, a worrisome finding as pigs can also
serve as hosts to human influenza viruses.6 The prevalence of the pathogenic strain increases the likelihood that it might adapt to people through
either co-infection resulting in reassortment or a spontaneous mutation,
making H5N1 a candidate for the next pandemic.
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It may not be possible to prevent the next pandemic from occurring, but
careful planning may delay the emergence and slow the spread of a pandemic strain, as well as mitigate the risks associated with an influenza
pandemic. Public health officials in the United States and around the world
have been working collaboratively for several years to improve pandemic
preparedness. These planning efforts have revealed a number of challenges that must not be overlooked. As the following narrative illustrates,
some of these challenges relate to improving interpandemic capacities
and others to making important decisions in advance to increase the speed
and efficiency of a pandemic response.
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Robust surveillance is
the key to a timely
response.

IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE AND
OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES
Time is of the essence in pandemic preparedness, and robust surveillance is the key to a timely response. The sooner a human infection by a
novel virus is identified, the sooner an investigation into the efficiency
of person-to-person transmission can commence. If the novel virus is
found to be communicable, steps can then be taken to initiate vaccine
production and begin containment strategies. Failure to identify the
novel virus early could ensure widespread disease and contribute to its
health and economic toll.
Ongoing influenza surveillance is conducted by a worldwide network of
110 National Influenza Centers and many other WHO laboratories in 83
countries.7 Each year, a sample of influenza virus isolates drawn from
these labs are intensively analyzed by WHO Reference Centers in London, Atlanta, Melbourne, and Tokyo. These reference centers examine the
viruses to identify emerging strains, and this information is used to formulate a vaccine for the next flu season. Although this process is very
effective for monitoring antigenic drift, it is unlikely that these routine
surveillance methods will detect an antigenic shift or novel virus. Routine laboratory analysis is conducted on a relatively small sample of influenza cases worldwide, therefore the probability that a novel virus will
be detected from this sample is very low.
Recognizing an antigenic shift will likely depend on alert clinicians, good
relationships between health professionals and public health authorities, and a robust public health infrastructure. Influenza is not a “reportable” disease, but health professionals are advised to alert public
health authorities of any unusual occurrence of infectious disease. The
expectation in most developed countries is that careful attention should
be paid to influenza outbreaks that are associated with unusual health
outcomes, such as those that cause death in healthy adults not considered at high risk for influenza mortality. It is hoped that such cases would
be intensively investigated and that WHO Reference Center laboratories would analyze clinical specimens quickly to determine if a novel
virus has emerged.
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Unfortunately, the parts of the world most hospitable to the
emergence of pandemic influenza are the least likely to have
robust surveillance capabilities. Novel viruses are more
likely to emerge in places where humans and animals
known to be influenza reservoirs, such as pigs and chickens, live in close proximity. Conditions in China and Southeast Asia may be particularly conducive to influenza
reassortment due to the number of households that contain
domesticated livestock and the prevalence of avian influenza in those regions. The influenza surveillance capabilities in many of those countries affected by the recent avian
flu outbreak are poor to nonexistent. Although several human cases of infection by a novel virus have been documented, experts worry that many more cases are occurring
without being detected or investigated.
Though international public health authorities have particular concerns about specific parts of the world, it is
worth noting that novel viruses and pandemics can
emerge anywhere. In fact, one theory suggests that the
1918 flu originated in Kansas. Furthermore, the strength
of surveillance capacity within the United States is not
above reproach; numerous studies have demonstrated the
delays associated with infectious disease reporting in this
country. Even at the height of the anthrax scare, health
professionals waited days before contacting public health
officials, in some cases.
Public health measures may be effective in preventing the
emergence of a pandemic strain if initiated early. Actions to
minimize the potential for animal-to-human transmission,
such as destroying poultry flocks infected with pathogenic
avian influenza virus, reduce the likelihood of human infection by a novel virus. Should human infection occur, isolation and aggressive treatment of affected patients may
decrease the likelihood of a reassortment event.
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Phases of a Pandemic
Phase 0, Preparedness Level 0
Inter-Pandemic Period: Three or four
strains of influenza virus circulating
which are similar to strains that have circulated in the recent past.

Phase 0, Preparedness Level 1
Initial Report of a New Strain in Humans

Phase 0, Preparedness Level 2
Novel Virus Alert: Human infection is
confirmed.

Phase 0, Preparedness Level 3
Human Transmission Confirmed

Phase 1
Confirmation of Onset of Pandemic: Efficient person to person transmission is
confirmed.

Phase 2
Regional and Multiregional Epidemics

Phase 3
End of First Pandemic Wave

Phase 4
Second or Later Waves of Pandemic
(typically 3 to 9 months following initial
epidemic)

Opportunities for delaying the spread of a possible pandemic virus are greatest when only a few clusters of cases
Phase 5
have occurred, that is before a pandemic has been declared.
End of Pandemic: Reversion to Phase 0.
At this stage, a variety of public health measures, such as
isolation of ill persons, contact tracing, quarantine of conSource: World Health Organization
tacts, and aggressive treatment with antiviral agents, may
prevent or slow further transmission. However, this window of opportunity is likely to close quickly if strong public health actions are not implemented rapidly. The time sensitivity of
these interventions underscores the need for effective surveillance to
identify early cases.
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Experts caution that surveillance capabilities both domestically and internationally require additional investment. These needs include:89
■ Better integration of clinical disease surveillance and laboratory-

based testing on influenza isolates.
■ Additional resources to support existing human surveillance activi-

ties, particularly in the developing world, including the development
of multidisciplinary teams to investigate unusual case clusters.
■ Expanded disease and virologic surveillance of animal reservoirs and

increased collaboration with veterinary disciplines to improve coordination of animal and human surveillance activities.
■ Development of additional diagnostic tools (such as reagents and

standardized laboratory protocols) for quickly identifying influenza
viruses of all subtypes circulating in both human and animal populations and prioritizing those known to have caused human infection.
■ Improved international efforts to coordinate data collection and

management.
■ Better education of health care professionals to enable recognition of

suspect cases and reporting to appropriate authorities.
Even with enhanced surveillance capacities, many experts believe that a
pandemic threat may not be evident until the disease has already become
widespread within a geographic area. This may happen either because
early surveillance failed to detect initial clusters or the virus emerged
with a full-fledged capacity for efficient human transmission.
Once a pandemic is officially declared, it is unclear whether additional
opportunities for slowing international spread and minimizing disease
penetration within affected populations are still available. Travel warnings, exit screening of travelers from affected areas, and measures to increase social distance (such as cancellation of mass gatherings and school
closings) may help to slow the spread of the disease. At this point, contact
tracing and quarantine of health contacts is not likely a wise use of resources, because the virus will have become too widespread to contain
through such targeted measures. Surveillance emphasis should also shift
at this point to monitor total disease burden and track epidemiological
trends to identify high-risk populations.10
Public anxiety will be running high if a pandemic is beginning to sweep
the globe, and public health officials must be prepared to respond to these
concerns. Skillful risk communication will be necessary to reduce panic
and help individuals make informed decisions. People will want information on what they can do to reduce the possibility of exposure, even
simple directives such as hand washing and when they should seek medical care if they become ill.
One of the biggest communication challenges will be helping the public
understand why vaccine will not be available early in the pandemic and
why it will be in short supply once it is produced. Some public health
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agencies are already using the annual influenza season to educate the
public on influenza vaccine production and to reinforce the importance
of good hygiene. These types of pre-pandemic efforts may help communications with the public during a pandemic, although the level of public
unrest likely during a pandemic will call for a more aggressive communications strategy.
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It will likely take a
minimum of six
months to produce a
pandemic influenza
vaccine.

VACCINE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION
Vaccination is the best defense against influenza. Available treatments have
serious limitations, and traditional public health containment efforts can
only hope to slow—not stop—a fast-moving, highly communicable disease like influenza. The vaccine serves to “jump start” the body’s immune
response by providing the body with antigenic material similar to the circulating viral strains, thus prompting the body to begin antibody production. Should the vaccinated person come into contact with the influenza
virus, their immune response will be poised to combat the disease agent.
The annual flu vaccine is safe and effective. Inactivated influenza vaccine
has been used widely for 60 years, and manufacturers have made significant improvements since its introduction.11 Although whole, inactivated
viruses were first used, partially disrupted viruses (split vaccines) and
purified envelope antigens (subunit vaccines) have since been introduced
to improve safety while maintaining effectiveness. Although a single inoculation of inactivated vaccine is generally sufficient for persons who
have had prior exposure to a similar strain, two inoculations are generally needed for persons with no prior exposure (a circumstance likely
during a pandemic).
Given current technology, it will likely take a minimum of six months to
begin manufacturing vaccine. Development and production of pandemic
influenza vaccine cannot be initiated until a novel virus is identified and
isolated. In light of the long lead time for development and the critical
importance of vaccine, pandemic preparedness efforts have focused substantially on shortening the time frame between the emergence of a pandemic virus and the availability of vaccine for distribution. While some
of these efforts center on improved surveillance, most target the vaccine
production process.

The Vaccine Production Process
Influenza vaccines are produced by inoculating embryonated hens’ eggs
(that is, eggs with embryos in them) with influenza virus. In the event of
a pandemic, the first step in this process will be the development of virus
“seeds” that match the antigenic profile of the circulating pandemic virus. In some cases, new strains do not grow well in the eggs, and a “high
growth reassortant virus” is developed to increase the yield of vaccine
virus per egg. In the recent past, such growth problems have delayed the
shipment of annual flu vaccine.
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It is also very possible that the emergent strain will be highly pathogenic
both for the embryonated chicken eggs and for the people involved in vaccine production. These issues will likely require both the use of specialized
biocontainment facilities and the introduction of genetic manipulation techniques, known as reverse genetics, to allow for the timely creation of a
safe, high-growth vaccine seed virus. Scientists estimate that the development of such a vaccine seed takes two to three months to complete
once a target strain is identified.12
After the eggs are inoculated, vaccine lots first become available within
four to five months.13 During this period, the vaccine virus replicates within
the eggs. Once sufficient growth has occurred, harvested egg fluids are
processed to concentrate, purify, and inactivate the virus from which the
vaccine will be produced. Further steps for purification and standardization of vaccine potency are then completed.
Similar to most vaccine products, the capital-intensive, specialized nature of the influenza vaccine production process tends to limit the number of manufacturers willing to compete in the market. Only three firms
currently produce influenza vaccine for the U.S. market. Both Aventis
Pasteur, Inc. and Chiron produce inactivated vaccine, and MedImmune,
Inc., produces a live, attenuated (or weakened) vaccine product. Because
production is highly concentrated among so few manufacturers, problems encountered by any one manufacturer can have a substantial impact on the availability of vaccine supply.

Proposals to Improve Production Capabilities
Ongoing efforts and proposals to speed the availability of influenza
vaccine in the event of a pandemic have focused on two major issues: (a)
improving the production capacity of existing technologies and (b) developing new production technologies that allow more vaccine to be produced
in a more timely manner. These efforts and proposed strategies include:
■ Increasing Annual Influenza Vaccine Rates. In 2003, approximately

87 million doses of influenza vaccine were produced for the U.S.
market.14 Assuming one dose per person, this production level would
support annual vaccination of roughly 30 percent of the U.S. population.15 In fact, the true vaccine coverage rate is probably lower, given
that some individuals, such as children receiving the vaccine for the
first time, require two doses. Manufacturers strive to peg production
volume, and thus production capacity, to the anticipated demand in
order to minimize financial losses due to unused supply. The long lead
time in vaccine production and the short “shelf life” of flu vaccine make
it difficult to respond quickly to changes in demand. When demand is
unexpectedly high, like it was in the 2003–2004 flu season, vaccine
shortages occur. Prompting and sustaining greater demand for the
annual vaccine would encourage manufacturers to invest in expanded
production capacity and might entice more manufacturers to enter the
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market. Some observers have advocated for guaranteed government
purchase of surplus vaccine and for public education to increase vaccination rates and help make yearly demand levels more predictable and
robust. However, opinions regarding the merit of this strategy are
mixed, as some observers have expressed concern about the long-term
effects of government purchase guarantees and how they might affect
market dynamics.
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Guaranteed government purchase of surplus vaccine may help
to expand vaccine production capacity.

■ Ensuring Year-round Egg Supply to Increase Surge Capacity. The

influenza vaccine is currently dependent on embryonated hens’ eggs, a
production process which in turn is dependent on the reproductive
biology of chickens. Vaccine manufacturers generally place orders for
eggs approximately 6 months before inoculation with the vaccine seed.
Depending on the time of year when the pandemic strikes, a supply of
eggs may not be available to support vaccine production. Ensuring
year-round availability of embryonated eggs could reduce the time to
vaccine production, and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) has made investments in this regard.
■ Developing Non–Egg-based Production Procedures. Cell culture–

based growth media for vaccine production is available and currently
licensed in some countries. Cell lines are necessary for reverse genetic
technologies and promise to eliminate some of the limitations inherent
to egg-based vaccine production. Expanding this capacity will involve
increasing the availability of suitable cell lines and encouraging manufacturers to diversify their production processes to include this technology
through regulatory and perhaps payment incentives. Efforts to achieve
these objectives have already been initiated. A move to cell-based vaccines would also require surveillance laboratories worldwide to begin
using cell lines approved for human vaccine use, a requirement that
would have significant resource and operational implications.
■ Initiating Advance Preparation of Vaccine Production Seeds.

Preparation of vaccine seeds and production reagents for all known
virus subtypes currently present in animal reservoirs could significantly expedite vaccine production when a pandemic strain emerges. If
a library of virus subtypes suitable for vaccine seeds were developed,
the first phase of vaccine production could be completed in advance of
the pandemic, reducing the production time line by several months.
Although the preselected vaccine would not likely be an exact antigenic
match to the pandemic strain, it would provide at least partial protection until a tailored vaccine could be produced. Priority could be given
to subtypes known to cause human infection, including the H2, H5, H7,
and H9 subtypes.16 The use of reserve genetic techniques to engineer
safe, high-growth variants of these subtypes could facilitate the ease
and speed of production. Clinical trials on experimental vaccines
produced from the seed library would also need to be conducted to
determine dosage requirements and to identify possible adverse reactions. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has
already awarded two contracts to support the production and testing of
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an investigational vaccine based on the avian strain of influenza
(H5N1) implicated in the recent, highly pathogenic outbreaks in Asia.
■ Reducing Legal Disincentives to Vaccine Production. A variety of

legal and regulatory concerns may hinder efforts to implement the
improvements described above. Vaccine manufacturers’ concerns
related to liability and compensation, variations in international
licensing standards, and intellectual property rights regarding organisms developed through reverse genetics are several factors that may
discourage investments in needed improvements or might delay
response activities in the event of a pandemic. Some manufacturers
have advocated for federal liability protections and a harmonization
of international laws and regulations related to vaccine development
and production to address these concerns.
■ Engaging in Additional Research. In addition to the development

activities described above, a wide range of other promising approaches
merit further research. For example, the use of live influenza vaccines
(currently licensed, but not in widespread use) needs to be evaluated in
light of the stronger immune response they elicit. This attribute could
be important in reducing the amount of vaccine required to produce an
immune response, thus stretching the available supply to cover more
people. Similarly, alternative vaccination techniques, such as new
dosage approaches and the use of adjuvants, may increase immune
response and conserve vaccine. Furthermore, some researchers believe
it may be possible to develop a “universal” influenza vaccine that
would be effective against all subtypes and would not be vulnerable to
antigenic shift or drift. Although such a breakthrough is not likely in
the foreseeable future, its long-term potential is intriguing.

Distribution Concerns
If the vaccine production challenges were not daunting enough, additional challenges will be faced once the first supplies of a pandemic vaccine are available for distribution. The first production lots will not be
adequate to vaccinate the entire population, and hard decisions will have
to be made in selecting priority populations. Essential personnel, such as
health care workers, police, and other first responders, are likely to be
prioritized for vaccination, as are high-risk populations. Older persons
and others with compromised health status will be at high risk for severe
illness. The degree to which other groups will also be at elevated risk for
severe outcomes is not certain, however, because the pathological characteristics of the pandemic virus cannot be ascertained until it emerges and
begins to spread.
It is unclear whether the market-based approach currently used for the
purchase and distribution of the annual flu vaccine will be suitable under
pandemic conditions. The urgent need to rush production, focus limited
vaccine supplies on priority populations, and ensure that vaccinations are
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administered immediately suggest that a more coordinated, governmentsponsored purchase and distribution arrangement could be needed. It is
unlikely that existing private sector contracts for vaccine supply would be
valid for a pandemic strain, as these contracts are specifically negotiated
each year for that year’s annual vaccine. Furthermore, existing distribution mechanisms would probably not be sufficiently timely or targeted.
When shortages were experienced in recent flu seasons, public health officials encountered a number of difficulties in attempting to redistribute
supplies to target those at highest risk, illustrating the shortcoming of a
market-based approach. However, a clear consensus regarding the most
appropriate approach to vaccine procurement and distribution has not
yet been reached.
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Government-sponsored
purchase and distribution of a pandemic vaccine may be needed.

Even if a coordinated distribution process is put into place, there will be
additional hurdles associated with implementing a mass immunization
program under conditions of social unrest and fear. Security measures
will be necessary to ensure that supply is not inappropriately diverted in
transit. Supplies will be limited, and tens of millions of vaccinations will
need to occur in a very short time frame. Such mass vaccinations will
require strong collaboration among public health authorities at the federal, state, and local levels and with private sector health care professionals. State and local public health planning and exercises for mass vaccination and drug distribution in preparation for bioterrorism attacks should
be helpful in this regard.
Clinical considerations will include ensuring the availability of trained personnel to administer the vaccine. Logistical considerations will include identifying and preparing vaccination sites, securing necessary supplies (such
as syringes), designing patient flow processes, and ensuring security. Legal
concerns related to informed consent must be addressed, and administrative processes must be established to document persons vaccinated, verify
their priority status, and document any adverse effects of the vaccine.

ANTIVIRALS AND OTHER
MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS
Because vaccine is not likely to be available in the early months of the
pandemic and initial supplies will be extremely limited, antiviral medications have the potential to play a very important role in pandemic response. Four antiviral agents—amantadine, rimantadine, oseltamivir, and
zanamivir—have been documented as effective for both prevention
(chemoprophylaxis) and early treatment of influenza. At this time, however, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved zanamivir
for treatment purposes only and limits prophylactic use of oseltamivir to
persons over the age of 13. Generic versions of amantadine and
rimantadine are available. Zanamivir (trade name Relenza) and
oseltamivir (trade name Tamiflu) are produced under patent by
GlaxoSmithKline and Roche Laboratories, Inc., respectively.
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For prophylactic purposes, antivirals have the advantage, relative to vaccine, of providing rapid onset of protection; unlike vaccine, however, this
protection is short lived. For prophalaxis, antivirals must be taken daily for
the entire time influenza is active in a community. For treatment purposes,
antivirals must be taken within two days of illness onset to be effective.

Stockpiling Decisions
The biggest limitation regarding antiviral treatments is inadequate availability and limited production surge capacity. Unlike vaccine, however,
antiviral agents can be stockpiled and planning efforts are examining this
strategy. Important considerations include the mix and volume of drugs
to include in the stockpile, the need to “forward deploy” these stockpiles
regionally ahead of the spread of disease, and the costs associated with
these fairly expensive products.
Even with enhanced stockpiles, strategic decisions will need to made regarding antiviral use. Essential personnel (such as police, public health
workers, and medical professionals) and high risk populations (such as
the aged, those in institutional settings, and others, depending on the
epidemiology of the disease) are likely candidates for priority populations to receive prophylactic antivirals. Targeting treatment supplies to
those at highest risk may be more difficult, as the delivery of care will be
highly decentralized.
In light of limited supplies, trade-offs between using the antivirals for
prophylaxis or treatment are inevitable. Mathematical modeling can help
to elucidate health impacts and cost effectiveness of alternative use and
distribution strategies. Available modeling evidence suggests that mass
prophylactic use of antivirals would not be efficient and that reserving
available stocks for treatment and targeted prophylaxis (such as for essential personnel or for initial contacts in the very earliest stages of the
pandemic) would be more prudent. Furthermore, the huge supply of
antivirals that would need to be stockpiled for mass prophylaxis make
this approach prohibitively expensive.
Some of the antiviral agents are known to stimulate the emergence of
resistant influenza viruses, a fact that will also influence both stockpile
composition and distribution strategies. Because these antiviral agents
are sometimes used to treat annual influenza outbreaks, there are concerns that the pandemic strain may emerge resistant to these agents as
well. Of particular concern is that the influenza viruses isolated from
human cases of avian flu in Asia show resistance to amantadine and
rimantadine. Other factors to consider are the side effects caused by available antiviral agents and the safety concerns these create.
Efforts to begin stockpiling antiviral agents will be influenced by the
activities of other nations as well. Japan has already begun stockpiling Tamiflu. It is unclear what impact the small number of
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manufacturers, limited production capacity, and potential for competing
orders internationally will have on the cost and the timetable for U.S. stockpile efforts.

Readiness of the Health Care Delivery System
Although antiviral agents will be important to managing an influenza pandemic, other types of medical care, such as proper hydration and nutrition,
antibiotic therapy to treat secondary bacterial infections, and respiratory
support interventions, are also important for reducing morbidity and
mortality. Efforts to increase pneumococcal immunization rates now could
reduce the threat of one of the more common secondary bacterial infections that often accompanies influenza. Pneumococcal immunization
would also bring immediate health benefits for the elderly and children
by decreasing the current incidence of pneumonia and ear infections.
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In light of existing
limitations for surge
capacity, an influenza
pandemic threatens
to unravel an already
frayed emergency
care system.

Even if the next pandemic turns out to be relatively benign, the sheer
volume of people requiring medical care will likely place heavy demands
on the health care delivery system. In the event of a pandemic, emergency departments will be flooded and hospitalization rates will soar.
Respiratory support equipment, such as ventilators, will also be in short
supply. Hospital emergency departments are already severely stressed
and are increasingly going on diversion status. This overcrowding is due,
in part, to capacity constraints related to inpatient beds, particularly in
intensive care units. In light of existing limitations for surge capacity, an
influenza pandemic threatens to unravel an already frayed emergency
care system. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
developed two modeling tools, FluAid and FluSurge, to assist public
health agencies and health care organizations in recognizing needs and
planning resource requirements under different scenarios.
The combination of surge capacity needs and infection control requirements will place extraordinary demands on the health care delivery
system. Although the very nature of a pandemic would make patient isolation infeasible, stringent infection control techniques (such as use of
personnel protective equipment, hand washing, and environmental disinfection) will be needed, and some efforts must be made to limit contact
between the sick and healthy in health care settings (such as the use of
restricted waiting areas).
As with the pandemic of 1918, the constraints on availability of medical
personnel, particularly nurses, will be problematic. Given existing
workforce constraints and the likely event that many health professionals will themselves be severely ill, there are concerns that there will not
be enough people to care for the sick. Hospitals and communities must
anticipate these shortages and consider strategies to respond to these extraordinary surge pressures.
Current activity related to bioterrorism preparedness will undoubtedly
help hospitals and health professionals prepare for large-scale infectious
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disease events. However, unlike a bioterrorist event, which could be concentrated in only a few communities, the pandemic is certain to affect the
entire nation—and the world—at the same time. Therefore, “borrowing”
personnel from neighboring jurisdictions will probably not be an option.
These workforce challenges, combined with bed and other physical constraints and infection control considerations, pose daunting planning challenges for health care delivery systems.
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What level of resources
could be needed to
implement all of the
preparedness steps
proposed?

THE U.S. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN
DHHS, in collaboration with multiple federal partners, recently released
a national plan to prepare for and respond to the next influenza pandemic.17 The department has articulated three major goals for pandemic
preparedness and response: (a) decrease the burden of disease, (b) minimize social disruption, and (c) reduce economic impacts.18
The plan consists of a “core” that describes national coordination roles
and decision-making authority, provides an overview of key issues, and
outlines response actions at national, state, and local levels.19 It also includes annexes that offer guidance for state and local health departments
and for health care organizations. Additional annexes provide detailed
technical information on issues related to surveillance, vaccine development and production, vaccine and antiviral use strategies, interventions
to decrease influenza transmission, communications, future research priorities, lessons learned from the 1976 swine flu program, and comparisons between influenza and other infectious diseases.
Preparedness and response require collaboration internationally, across
federal agencies, with state and local health officials, with private sector
health care organizations and professionals, and with the public at large.
Therefore, DHHS released this plan as a “draft” document, to elicit comments. The department anticipates that this process will help to refine the
plan, which in fact must be continually modified over time to accommodate scientific advances and other changes in the world landscape.
The national plan provides a clear framework for advancing pandemic
planning, but does not conclusively resolve a number of important decisions, due in part to the unpredictable nature of the pandemic threat.
Although there is fairly strong scientific consensus regarding the steps
that should be taken to enhance pandemic preparedness, many unresolved
policy questions remain:
■ Resource Allocation. In many respects, pandemic influenza plan-

ning involves resource allocation decisions. What level of resources
would be needed to implement all of the preparedness steps that have
been proposed? Given that resources are likely to be limited in some
fashion due to competing policy goals, how should priorities in
funding be set? Which pandemic preparedness investments promise
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to be most cost-effective? Which are most critical for ensuring adequate
response? How should funding obligations be shared internationally
and domestically? Are targeted appropriations required, or should
important pandemic initiatives be absorbed within agencies’ existing
budgets? The national plan does not include specific budgetary recommendations, therefore pending decisions related to the funding and
financing of pandemic preparedness investments will likely guide the
extent of and time frame for readiness capabilities.
■ Federal Role in Vaccine Purchase and Distribution. The plan does

not establish a definitive federal role in purchasing and distributing a
pandemic vaccine in advance of a pandemic crisis. The plan allows for
alternative scenarios, including complete federal purchase and distribution to states, partial federal purchase, and minimal federal purchase,
depending on the nature of the pandemic. The plan also suggests that
the federal role in vaccine purchase is likely to shift as the pandemic
unfolds and vaccine becomes increasingly more available. Who should
control the limited supply of vaccine? What criteria will be used to
determine if complete federal purchase is warranted or when partial or
minimal purchase should commence? Who will make decisions regarding how vaccine will be allocated across populations and across jurisdictions? Current ambiguity related to these questions requires states to
develop multiple approaches to vaccine distribution and raises concerns about whether state-level public purchasing should be pursued.
Industry representatives are equally apprehensive about these questions because the decisions will have important implications for their
own marketing and investment strategies. The uncertain federal government role in vaccine procurement and distribution extends to
multiple “second order” policies related to legislative authority, financing mechanisms, contractual agreements, and price negotiations.
Absent a resolution of the federal role, multiple contingency plans must
be established for these second order policies.
■ Antiviral Stockpile Strategy. The composition of, size of, and

deployment strategy for the antiviral stockpile are presently open
issues. Which antiviral agents should be stockpiled? How much of each
should be secured? Where and how should the stockpile be deployed?
Again, these decisions will have ripple effects throughout the pharmaceutical industry and public health infrastructure. One proposal being
considered is whether to procure some of the antiviral agents in
“jumbo” containers, rather than in traditional single or multiple dose
units. Such an approach would save on packaging costs and could help
to minimize acquisition costs, but would also raise logistical challenges
and dispensing costs for those responsible for distributing antivirals.
Further analyses of the costs and benefits of alternative strategies will
help to clarify the best approach to antiviral stockpiling.
■ Determination of Priority Populations. The national plan charges

states with establishing priority populations and offers broad guidance in
this regard. Identifying which populations will get priority in receiving
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vaccine and antiviral agents is likely to be a fairly controversial topic.
Prioritizing essential personnel relative to high-risk individuals will
probably generate a fair amount of debate, as will identifying specific
groups of essential personnel, such as health care workers, police, fire
and rescue personnel, and public health personnel. Potential differences
in strategy across states may give rise to perceived inequities. How can
these differences be harmonized? At the local level, classes of prioritized
populations must be translated into actual, current lists of individuals to
determine the quantity of vaccine and antiviral agents that will be
required. This exercise suggests that the prioritization will be an iterative process and is tied to expectations regarding available vaccine
supply as the pandemic evolves.
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Under what circumstances might U.S. vaccine supply be made
available to other
countries?

■ International Distribution of Vaccine. Planning related to vaccine

purchase and distribution in the United States will need to be considered
in the context of international demand. Some observers have noted that
any given nation will only have access to the vaccine supplies produced
within their borders in the event of a pandemic. If this is the case, U.S.
planning efforts will need to make clear distinctions between domestic
and imported vaccine production capacity. At the same time, U.S. policy
will ultimately need to consider whether domestically produced vaccine
will be made available to other nations and under what circumstances.
■ Vaccine Production Improvements. Expanding vaccine production

capabilities may involve a balance between increasing the capacity of
prevailing technologies and accelerating the development and adoption
of new technologies. Though there is likely to be an attempt to pursue
both strategies simultaneously, resource constraints may force a decision to favor one approach over the other. Which approaches appear to
be the most cost effective? The most expedient?
■ Liability Protections and Other Legal Considerations. Observers

have noted that a variety of legal concerns create significant disincentives
to manufacturers considering the adoption of new vaccine production
technology. These concerns relate to the potential liability exposure
created by new approaches, intellectual property rights that limit the
application of new techniques, and regulatory provisions that discourage
investment in new production methods. Would addressing these issues
increase the vaccine industry’s motivation to pursue change? What are
the costs and consequences of decreasing these legal burdens?
■ Research Agenda. A broad variety of new and future insights and

scientific advances in influenza virology have the potential to reshape
the parameters of influenza preparedness. Investments in these pursuits provide long-term promise but do not translate into immediate
improvements in readiness. Balancing short-term versus long-term
objectives represents a complex policy trade-off.
■ Surveillance Enhancements. Improvements in both domestic and

international influenza surveillance involve a variety of investments,
ranging from information systems development and laboratory
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enhancements to the training of personnel. Debate is likely to focus on who
should be responsible for making these investments. Should the U.S.
contribute to surveillance capacity in other nations? Should states bear
some or all of the costs of surveillance improvements within their borders?

August 27, 2004

“The pandemic clock is
ticking. We just don’t
know what time it is.”

■ Public Health Capacity and Health System Readiness. Although

the federal government is likely to assume responsibility for a number
of key functions in pandemic preparedness and response, public health
and health care delivery systems at the local level will very likely be
asked to deliver vaccine, antivirals, health care services, and public
health protections. These parties will look to the national plan to
determine the depth and quality of the guidance it offers for carrying
out these responsibilities. How much standardization in response
protocols and capabilities is warranted? Should the federal government
fund the planning and capacity building required to meet such standards? The national plan encourages states to program funding from
the Bioterrorism Cooperative Agreement and the 2004 Immunization
Continuation Grant for pandemic preparedness planning. State health
departments and health care providers will likely seek greater clarity
regarding the degree to which federal resources will be available to
support pandemic influenza planning.
Many of these issues will require legislative action of some type and will
rely on Congress for final resolution. While some of these policy questions may be considered and resolved in advance of the pandemic crisis,
as additional analyses and negotiations are completed, others may be
entirely dependent on the unique epidemiological and clinical characteristics of the pandemic virus. This degree of uncertainty is reflected in the
national influenza plan as different contingencies are explored.
Although it cannot answer all open questions, the release of the national
plan will encourage dialogue among public health officials at all levels of
government and will facilitate the development of well integrated stateand local-level plans. As countries across the world develop national plans,
international coordination can also be carried out under the auspices of
the WHO. Such coordination will help minimize inconsistencies across
states or nations that might impede a pandemic response. This interactive and interdependent response is critical in light of the global nature of
the pandemic threat.

CONCLUSION
“The pandemic clock is ticking. We just don’t know what time it is.”20
These words accurately capture the challenge of pandemic influenza.
Although there is a sense of urgency among public health officials, mustering political will and public attention may be difficult given the
unpredictable (though inevitable) nature of the pandemic influenza.
When confronted by immediate health threats and other social priorities, it may be tempting to forgo or delay investment in pandemic
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preparedness and response capabilities. The difficult compromises and
horrible consequences conjured by thoughts of a pandemic create discomfort, threaten to alienate responsible parties, and dampen open discourse. Lessons from the past, along with promising developments in
the present, argue for confronting the challenges of this certain future
threat sooner rather than later.
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